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Abstract
This paper aims to create a secure environment for networked control systems composed of multiple dynamic entities and
computational control units via networking, in the presence of disclosure attacks. In particular, we consider the situation where
some dynamic entities or control units are vulnerable to attacks and can become malicious. Our objective is to ensure that
the input and output data of the benign entities are protected from the malicious entities as well as protected when they are
transferred over the networks in a distributed environment. Both these security requirements are achieved using cryptographic
techniques. However, the use of cryptographic mechanisms brings additional challenges to the design of controllers in the
encrypted state space; the closed-loop system gains and states are required to match the specified cryptographic algorithms.
In this paper, we propose a methodology for the design of secure networked control systems integrating the cryptographic
mechanisms with the control algorithms. The approach is based on the separation principle, with the cryptographic techniques
addressing the security requirements and the control algorithms satisfying their performance requirements.
Key words: Networked control systems, Large-scale systems, Cyberphysical security, Encryption, Quantization, Stabilization
1 Introduction
Large-scale systems (LSSs) have been rapidly devel-
oped in interdisciplinary fields with the technological
advances in computer science, software engineering, and
systems engineering. The concept of LSS adopted in
this paper involves dynamic systems involving a large
number of states, control inputs, and parameters; see,
e.g., [1, 2]. Such systems usually consist of a class of in-
terconnected subsystems with physical coupling among
them. It also includes the class of multi-agent systems
and complex systems. In these systems, people are more
interested in their collective phenomena and behav-
iors. A common feature of these LSSs is that they have
multiple dynamic entities. Therefore, attacks can occur
on a partial set of entities rather than the whole sys-
tem, which necessitates the need to protect parts of the
system even though some other parts are under attack.
For either a small-scale or a large-scale system, the con-
troller may be implemented on a remote computing unit
if the system itself does not have local computing facili-
ties. Such an architecture is known as a networked con-
trol system (NCS) [3–5]. It is also called a cyberphysical
system especially as it involves physical dynamics and
computer based algorithms via networking. The main
challenges in studying NCSs lie in understanding the
control principles with sampling, quantization, commu-
nication time-delay, packet dropout, etc. NCSs can find
extensive applications in different fields, including smart
grids, transportation, smart cities, and so on.
The present research is on large-scale systems with net-
worked control (LSS-NC), which is the synthesis of the
aforementioned two concepts and involves all the as-
sociated research issues. It has become a class of rep-
resentative complicated engineering systems involving
various state-of-the-art technologies. For instance, con-
trollers for a group of drones lacking onboard comput-
ing capacity are usually implemented on decentralized
remote computing base stations [6, 7]. A railway system
is a typical large-scale system with strong physical cou-
pling among trains, whose dispatch planning and con-
trol is typically implemented in remote central stations
through various network communication [8]. The main
target of this research is not on the traditional control is-
sues for LSSs and/or NCSs but on the need to develop a
secure environment. LSS-NC is indeed a niche platform
for the research from the security perspective because
it allows us the possibility of protecting a whole system
even when its partial dynamic entities or remote control
units are subject to attack.
Security and privacy have become critical issues for mod-
ern industrial systems. Improperly addressing these is-
sues could result in massive economic losses or even
threats of human safety. Specifically, attack may oc-
cur ubiquitously and we consider the circumstance for
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LSS-NC that some dynamic entities or control units
are hacked and can become malicious. The secure envi-
ronment studied in this paper involves the system en-
tities having mechanisms to protect their private in-
put/output information from the malicious entities and
controllers.
In the literature, the significance of addressing the cyber-
physical security of NCSs has been widely recognized [9–
14]. For example, cyberattacks such as Stuxnet malware
[15] to typical NCSs operated through supervisory con-
trol and data acquisition (SCADA) systems have been
well studied in, e.g., [16, 17]. Researchers are interested
in knowing how much damage attacks can cause by in-
jecting malicious signals or commands into an NCS and
what can be done to mitigate that damage [18–20]. The
research in this paper is mainly concerned about data
confidentiality violation by disclosure attacks. There has
been an increasing interest for development of sophisti-
cated control and estimation algorithms with encrypted
data for defending disclosure attacks in [21–25] among
others.
Also, the research on secure LSSs has been attempted
in recent literature, in particular, on consensus of MASs
[26–29]. Privacy and security challenges associated with
consensus protocol are of great practical and theoretical
importance in a wide range of applications. An MAS
requires information exchange via network to achieve
consensus. Meanwhile, it is usually important to avoid
information leakage during information exchange in a
secure control environment. Apart from these cryptog-
raphy based approaches, noise-based obfuscation ap-
proaches are also well studied that mask the true state
values by adding or subtracting random noises to the
control process. The research along this line has also
been rapidly developed over the past years; see, e.g.,
[29–31].
In the design of secure networked control systems, we
consider two specific security requirements. The first re-
quirement is concerned with the protection of informa-
tion being transferred over the networks. For instance,
the input and output data transferred between the sys-
tem (plant) and the controller over untrusted networks.
The second requirement is concerned with the protec-
tion of data between the components within a system.
For instance, consider a system consisting of say three
subcomponents A, B and C. This requirement is con-
cerned with securing the data generated by the compo-
nent A from the components B and C. Similarly for data
generated by components B and C. Such protection will
be needed if there is mutual distrust between the vari-
ous components within a system. Hence the first require-
ment addresses protection between systems, whereas the
second requirement is concerned with protection within
a system. To achieve both these security requirements,
we have developed a double-layer security scheme us-
ing cryptographic mechanisms. One cryptographic layer
offers protection against attacks on external networks,
connecting the system plant(s) with the control units.
The other layer provides cryptographic mechanisms of-
fering protection of data from each of the components
within the system.
Compared to the aforementioned literature on secure
control of NCSs, our contribution proposes an approach
to security that is more comprehensive. Often the works
on NCSs have not differentiated the system entities,
only considering the case when the remote controller is
attacked, which is the first security objective. On the
other hand, the works on the LSSs have mainly focused
on the controller being synthesized within the entity,
thereby not addressing separately attacks on the con-
troller, which is only the second security objective.
When it comes to the implementation of the two security
layers, in general, one has a choice of several cryptosys-
tems to choose from. In this paper, we use the RSA [32]
and Paillier [33] cryptosystems to realize the two security
layers, as both these systems are well known and have
been used in many research works in control systems. In
terms of formal security properties, though Paillier is se-
mantically secure, algorithms such as RSA are not. The
notion of semantic security implies that any information
revealed cannot be feasibly extracted and is equivalent
to the property of ciphertext indistinguishability un-
der chosen-plaintext attack. However, algorithms such
as RSA can be made to be semantically secure through
the use of random encryption padding schemes such as
Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding [34]. For the
purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to argue that the
schemes we have used are informally secure in that given
a ciphertext and the public encryption key, a compu-
tationally bounded adversary will not be able to deter-
mine the actual plaintext or at least the probability of
this happening can be made to be very low using well-
constructed public key systems (e.g. for RSA, choos-
ing suitable design parameters such as appropriate large
primes and suitable exponents etc.).
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First,
we propose a novel double-layer security scheme using
cryptographic mechanisms to satisfy both of our secu-
rity objectives mentioned above. We instantiate such a
double-layer scheme by Paillier-RSA encryption tech-
niques. The original signals coming from different com-
ponents in a system are encrypted in an inner layer to
protect the transfer of data over an insecure communi-
cation network. Then there is an outer-layer protecting
the data between the components. The inner-layer of-
fers protection against external attackers and the outer-
layer offers protection between various system compo-
nents. The combination of both these protection layers
provides security of the overall networked control sys-
tem.
Second, a systematic methodology is proposed for the
design of a secure networked control system based on
the principle of separation consisting of four procedures,
namely, quantization, encryption, control, and decryp-
tion. This is being decomposed into two independent
sub-problems, namely, a nonencrypted control prob-
lem and a quantization-encryption-decryption problem.
2
Both sub-problems should be characterized in the same
bounded space as described in Section 4 to avoid com-
putation overflow or underflow. We provide a rigorous
mathematical proof illustrating this. Another charac-
teristic of this cryptographic design strategy is that
it is independent of control problem. That is, we can
separately handle different controller design problems
to achieve different desired control objectives while
simultaneously achieving the security objectives.
Third, we apply the proposed double-layer crypto-
graphic mechanisms and the secure control approach to
solve a class of practical problem, namely, the encrypted
centralized control problem for stabilization of multi-
input multi-output (MIMO) systems. The effectiveness
of the proposed design is illustrated theoretically and
by numerical simulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents preliminary concepts and algorithms.
Section 3 gives the rigorous problem formulation. Sec-
tion 4 presents a general encrypted LSS-NC architecture.
A specific controller design for the stabilization problem
of MIMO systems is given in Section 5 followed by a nu-
merical example. Finally, we close the paper with some
concluding remarks in Section 6.
Notation. The vector lumped by the vectors c1, · · · , cr
is denoted by col(c1, . . . , cr) = [c
T
1 , . . . , c
T
r ]
T . For a set
S, its element a is denoted by a ∈ S. For a vector a =
[a1, · · · , ar]T , writing a A S means that ai ∈ S, i =
1, · · · , r. For a scalar variable and scalar valued function
E , element-wise operation is used throughout the paper,
that is, E(a) = [E(a1), · · · , E(ar)]T . For a vector a, its
Euclidean norm is denoted by ‖a‖ and its maximum
norm by ‖a‖∞. For a real matrix A, its induced 2-norm
is denoted by ‖A‖, and its element-wise absolute value
by |A|. Let 1 be a column vector whose elements are all
1 and I an identity matrix and dimension is from the
context.
2 Preliminaries
Using cryptographic algorithms to encrypt and decrypt
messages during the control process provides the techni-
cal foundation for creating a secure environment. In this
section, we first revisit some preliminaries of RSA [32]
and Paillier [33]. Quantization of signals, as pre-requisite
for signal encryption, is also discussed.
RSA is a well-known public-key cryptosystem, based on
the computational difficulty of factorizing a large com-
posite number. In RSA, the encryption key is public and
it is different from the decryption key, which is kept se-
cret (private). The encryption process can be denoted
by a function ER : ZnR 7→ ZnR for a prescribed posi-
tive integer nR and the decryption process by its inverse
E−1R . Throughout the paper, we denote the set of inte-
gers modulo n as Zn = [0, 1, · · · , n− 1].
The Paillier cryptosystem, named after the inventor Pas-
cal Paillier, is a probabilistic asymmetric algorithm for
public key cryptography. It is based on the fact that
computing n-th residue classes is computationally diffi-
cult. Also, in Paillier cryptosystem, the encryption key is
public and it is different from the decryption key which
is kept secret (private). The encryption process can be
denoted by a function EP : ZnP 7→ Z∗n2
P
for a prescribed
positive integer nP and the decryption process by its
inverse E−1P . Here, Z∗n = {a ∈ Zn | gcd(a, n) = 1}.
The Paillier cryptosystem has an additive homomor-
phic property Ep(m1 + m2) = Ep(m1)Ep(m2) modn2P
for m1,m2,m1 +m2 ∈ ZnP . This property means that,
given only the public key and the encryption of m1 and
m2, one can compute the encryption of m1 +m2.
The computation associated with encryption and de-
cryption procedures in the aforementioned cryptosys-
tems is performed on integers. To facilitate the proce-
dures in control systems, we need to apply a function
that converts an analogue signal into integers. For this
purpose, we define a set of signed fixed-point rational
numbers in base 2, Q(n,m), that contains all rational
numbers in [−2n−m−1, 2n−m−1 − 2−m] separated from
each other by 2−m, that is,
Q(n,m) :=
{
− bn2n−m−1 +
n−1∑
i=1
2i−m−1bi
| bi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
.
The positive integers n,m determine the length and the
resolution of the fixed-point rationals. Moreover, a map-
ping In,m : Q(n,m) 7→ Z2n is defined to convert the ra-
tionals into integers, with In,m(a) = 2mamod 2n,∀a ∈
Q(n,m). This mapping is bijective with the inverse map-
ping I−1n,m : Z2n 7→ Q(n,m) expressed as
I−1n,m(a) =
{
(a− 2n)/2m, a ≥ 2n−1
a/2m, otherwise
,∀a ∈ Z2n .
In summary, there are four elementary functions used in
the problem formulation, representing rational-integer
conversion and encryption, as follows:
In,m : Q(n,m) 7→ Z2n
EP : ZnP 7→ Zn2P , nP > 2
n
ER,i : ZnR 7→ ZnR
E¯R,i : ZnR 7→ ZnR , nR ≥ n2P , i = 1, · · · , N (1)
where the subscripts P and R represent Paillier and
RSA, respectively, as further explained in Theorem 4.2.
The specific selections of these functions, including the
encryption keys, will be elaborated in the next section.
Based on these functions, we define the following com-
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posite functions, for the convenience of presentation:
Eo(s) = EP (In,m(s))
Ei(s) = ER,i(Eo(s))
Di(s) = E−1R,i(s)
E¯i(s) = E¯R,i(s)
Do(s) = I−1n,m(E−1P (s) mod 2n)
D¯i(s) = Do(E¯−1i (s)). (2)
3 Problem Formulation
We consider a large-scale control system composed of
N ≥ 1 entities (components) whose dynamics are given
as follows
xi(k + 1) = fi(x(k), ui(k))
yi(k) = hi(xi(k), ui(k)), i = 1, · · · , N, (3)
where xi(k) ∈ Rs is the state, ui(k) ∈ Rp the input,
and yi(k) ∈ Rq the output, of the i-th entity. The func-
tions fi and hi describe the entity’s evolution and mea-
surement. The discrete time axis is labeled by the index
k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , in particular, with k = 0 being regarded
as the initial time. The vector x = col(x1, · · · , xN ) is the
lumped state of the whole system. The dynamics govern-
ing x generally represent N coupled entities as fi(x, ui)
depends on x. They also include N isolated entities as a
special case when fi(x, ui) depends on xi only, explicitly
rewritten as fi(xi, ui).
The output signal yi(k), i = 1, · · · , N , is quantized
as yqi (k) A Q(n,m), which is transformed into inte-
ger plaintext and hence encrypted before transmission
over the network, resulting in the ciphertext yi(k).
The postscript q represents quantization of the signal,
which rounds the elements of the signal to the nearest
elements of Q(n,m) less than or equal to the signal. A
uniform quantization space Q(n,m) is used for all en-
tities i = 1, · · · , N , with the specified integers n and
m depending on the storage capacity. This process is
represented by the mapping
yi(k) = Ei
([
yqi (k)
−yqi (k)
])
(4)
where Ei contains the double-layer encryption, compos-
ite of ER,i and EP , as well as a rational-integer conver-
sion In,m. It is worth noting that both yqi (k) and−yqi (k)
are encrypted when they are used in control design. By
doing so, any linear operation on yqi (k), i = 1, · · · , N ,
can be regarded as pure summation (not involving sub-
traction) on yqi (k) and −yqi (k), i = 1, · · · , N .
A control algorithm implemented in the remote con-
Fig. 1. Illustrative diagram of secure networked control for
large-scale systems. The plant entities are represented by
circles, the control units are within the remote rectangle, and
the encryption and decryption protocols are represented by
lockers and keys, respectively.
troller is of the following form
vi(k) = κi(zi(k),D1(y1(k)), · · · ,DN (yN (k)))
zi(k + 1) = κi(zi(k),D1(y1(k)), · · · ,DN (yN (k)))
zi(0) = Eo
([
ζi(0)
−ζi(0)
])
(5)
where vi(k), zi(k) A Zn2
P
, ζi(0) A Q(n,m) and the control
functions κi and κi rely on the received ciphertext yi(k)
with a proper decryption, i.e.,D1(y1(k)), · · · ,DN (yN (k)).
The choice of ζi(0) is arbitrary. Note that Di decrypts
the outer-layer encryption ER,i, that is,
Di(yi(k)) = Eo
([
yqi (k)
−yqi (k)
])
. (6)
Also, the functions κi and κi must be properly designed
such that their values are always within the set Zn2
P
to
avoid a computation overflow; this is elaborated further
later.
A general dynamic controller is used in the formulation,
with zi(k) being the state of the dynamic compensator.
In this paper, such a remote architecture is referred to
as a networked control scheme. The architecture is cen-
tralized if each controller unit relies on the ciphertexts
from all the entities. It also contains decentralized con-
trol scenario when the functions κi and κi rely on the
ciphertexts from some (not all) entities, according to a
specified communication network topology.
The designed control command vi(k) is again encrypted
before transmission over network, resulting in a cipher-
text vi(k), represented by the mapping
vi(k) = E¯i(vi(k)). (7)
Finally, the control command ui(k) is decrypted from
4
vi(k) when it is received by the i-th entity, that is,
ui(k) = D¯i(vi(k)), (8)
where D¯i contains a double-layer decryption composite
of E¯−1i and E−1P , as well as an integer-rational conversion
I−1n,m.
The networked control process for large-scale systems is
explained above and its architecture is also illustrated
in Figure 1. The overall controller is composed of (4),
(5), (7), and (8), which is called a private controller, It,
together with the plant (3), makes the complete closed-
loop system denoted by
Σ = (3) + (4) + (5) + (7) + (8). (9)
On the architecture of Σ, the main objective is stated
below following the rigorous definitions of security and
some remarks.
Definition 3.1 A signal a(k) is secure in a ciphertext
a(k) to a party if the private decryption key is unavailable
to the party.
Definition 3.2 The system Σ is secure if the following
two properties are satisfied:
(i) the signals yqi (k) and ui(k) are secure in the ciphertexts
yi(k) and vi(k), respectively, to all the entities and
control units except the self-entity i;
(ii) the signals yqi (k) and ui(k) are secure inDi(yi(k)) and
vi(k), respectively, to all the control units.
Remark 3.1 Encryption can protect the confidentiality
of messages, which is the specific meaning of security in
this paper. We call a message (signal) secure to an unau-
thorized party (adversary) if the party can only access its
ciphertext but not the decryption key. Therefore, there
exists no polynomial-time algorithm that an adversary
can use to tell which of the messages could potentially
be the plaintext corresponding to a ciphertext more likely
than the other to be the actual plaintext. On the architec-
ture of Σ, all the entities and control units are considered
as curious-but-honest adversaries. On one hand, there
is mutual distrust between every components. They aim
to steal another entity’s measurement output and con-
trol input, i.e., yqi (k) and ui(k). The information all the
entities and control units can access includes the cipher-
texts yi(k) and vi(k). The control units can also access
the texts Di(yi(k)) and vi(k). This setting implies the
two properties (i) and (ii) in Definition 3.2. On the other
hand, all the entities and control units are honest adver-
saries, that is, they run pass arbitrary messages without
interfering with the outcomes. Other techniques are still
needed to protect the security in terms of integrity and
authenticity of a message, which are however out of the
scope of this paper.
Remark 3.2 The property (i) of Definition 3.2 consid-
ers the protection of information transferred over un-
trusted networks, that is, the protection of entity i’s in-
formation yqi (k) or ui(k) in the transmission ciphertexts
yi(k) or vi(k). The information is protected from the
controller and each of the entities within the system. The
property (ii) addresses the protection of information be-
tween the system and the controller, that is, the protec-
tion of entity i’s information yqi (k) or ui(k) during op-
erations within the controller.
Remark 3.3 The necessity of using a double-layer cryp-
tographic strategy has been mentioned in the motivat-
ing example at the beginning of Section 2. More specif-
ically, this approach is used to ensure both properties
(i) and (ii). If a single-layer cryptographic mechanism
is applied, there exist two typical scenarios, neither of
which can achieve these properties. (a) The decryption
Di of the control unit is selected as the inverse function
of Ei, that is, Di(yi(k)) = Di(Ei(col(yqi (k),−yqi (k)))) =
col(yqi (k),−yqi (k)). Then the measurement yqi (k) can be
directly used in the controller (5), which much simplifies
the controller design. However, in such a scenario, a ma-
licious control unit would easily detect the output mea-
surement yqi (k) of the entity. So, (ii) is thus violated. (b)
In the second case, no decryption is applied at the control
unit. The ciphertext yi(k) must use the same cryptosys-
tem for all entities to facilitate the design of an effective
controller. As a result, (i) is violated, as the signal yi(k)
does not remain secure with respect to other entities in
the transmission ciphertext yi(k).
The objective of the paper is to find the encryption proto-
cols EP , ER,i, and E¯R,i, and the private control algorithm
represented by the functions κi and κi, for i = 1, · · · , N ,
such that
• P1: the system Σ has the desired control performance:
there exist ζi(k) A Q(n,m), k ≥ 0 and a set X, such
that,
zi(k) = Eo
([
ζi(k)
−ζi(k)
])
and, with xc(k) = col(x(k), ζ(k)) and ζ = col(ζ1, · · · , ζN ),
‖xc(k)‖ ≤ αρk‖xc(0)‖+ ς2−m, ∀xc(0) ∈ X, (10)
for some α, ς > 0 and 0 < ρ < 1.
• P2: the system Σ is secure in the sense of Defini-
tion 3.2.
Remark 3.4 The property P1 describes the desired con-
trol performance in two classes of problems, stabiliza-
tion and consensus, which are rigorously formulated here
and will be explicitly investigated in Sections V and VI,
respectively. The formulation includes a residual error
ς2−m as the measurements are quantized for encryption,
which will be further examined. It is worth mentioning
that the proposed encryption architecture is separated
from the desired control performance, and hence can be
applied to tackle security in more control problems and
applications. The security property P2 has been explained
in the remarks following Definition 3.2.
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4 A Double-Layer Cryptographic Architecture
A general secure networked control design paradigm
using cryptographic mechanisms is proposed in this
section. In particular, the separation principle in
this paradigm enables the quantization-encryption-
decryption protocol to be separated from the control al-
gorithm design. This principle is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Consider the system Σ satisfying the fol-
lowing three properties for two specified integers n and
m.
• (Controller subject to perturbation) There exists a con-
troller
ui(k) =κˆi(ζi(k), y1(k) + δ1(k), · · · ,
yN (k) + δN (k))
ζi(k + 1) =κˆi(ζi(k), y1(k) + δ1(k), · · · ,
yN (k) + δN (k)) (11)
and a set X, such that the closed-loop system com-
posed of (3) and (11) has the desired control perfor-
mance (10) for any |δi| < 2−m. Moreover, the sig-
nals yi(k), ui(k), ζi(k) A [−2n−m−1, 2n−m−1), i =
1, · · · , N .
• (Quantization property) The output signal yi(k) can
be quantized as
yqi (k) A Q(n,m), ‖yi(k)− yqi (k)‖∞ < 2−m, (12)
and the functions κˆi and κˆi satisfy
κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN ), κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN ) A Q(n,m) (13)
for col(co, c1, · · · , cN ) A Cn,m where the set Cn,m is
defined as follows
Cn,m :={col(co, c1, · · · , cN ) A Q(n,m) |
κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN ), κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN ) A
[−2n−m−1, 2n−m−1)}.
• (Cryptographic property) The functions κi, κˆi, κi, and
κˆi, satisfy
Do(κi(Eo(co,−co), Eo(c1,−c1), · · · , Eo(cN ,−cN )))
=κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN )
κi(Eo(co,−co), Eo(c1,−c1), · · · , Eo(cN ,−cN ))
=Eo
([
κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN )
−κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN )
])
(14)
for col(co, c1, · · · , cN ) A Cn,m. Then, the system Σ
achieves the property P1, when the initial condition
satisfies
col(ζi(0), y
q
1(0), · · · , yqN (0)) A Cn,m. (15)
To simplify the notation, we use Eo(c,−c) for Eo(col(c,−c))
throughout the paper.
Proof: Consider the closed-loop system Σ composed of
(3), (4), (5), (7), and (8). Let δi(k) = y
q
i (k)−yi(k). From
the quantization property, one has ‖δi‖∞ < 2−m.
Assume there exists a constant k¯ ≥ 0 such that
zi(k) = Eo
([
ζi(k)
−ζi(k)
])
and
col(ζi(k), y
q
1(k), · · · , yqN (k)) A Cn,m, k = 0, · · · , k¯.
(16)
This statement is true with k = 0; see the initial con-
dition in (5) and (15). We will prove the statement for
k = k¯ + 1 and then apply mathematical induction.
From (6), the first two equations in (5) become
vi(k) =κi(zi(k), Eo(yq1(k),−yq1(k)), · · · ,
Eo(yqN (k),−yqN (k)))
zi(k + 1) =κi(zi(k), Eo(yq1(k),−yq1(k)), · · · ,
Eo(yqN (k),−yqN (k))).
The second equation further implies that, using the cryp-
tographic property, and noting (16), we have
zi(k + 1) =κi(Eo(ζi(k),−ζi(k)), Eo(yq1(k),−yq1(k)),
· · · , Eo(yqN (k),−yqN (k)))
=Eo
([
κˆi(ζi(k), yq1(k), · · · , yqN (k))
−κˆi(ζi(k), yq1(k), · · · , yqN (k))
])
=Eo
([
ζi(k + 1)
−ζi(k + 1)
])
for
ζi(k + 1) = κˆi(ζi(k), yq1(k), · · · , yqN (k)). (17)
From the cryptographic property again, one has the fol-
lowing equation, noting (16),
Do(vi(k)) = κˆi(ζi(k), yq1(k), · · · , yqN (k))
It is noted that ui(k) = D¯i(E¯i(vi(k))) = Do(vi(k)). As a
result,
ui(k) = κˆi(ζi(k), y
q
1(k), · · · , yqN (k)). (18)
The set of equations (17)-(18) is equivalent to (11), for
k = 0, · · · , k¯. As a result, yi(k¯ + 1) and ζi(k¯ + 1) are
determined by the closed-loop system composed of (3)
and (11).
6
From the quantization property, one has yi(k¯ + 1) A
[−2n−m−1, 2n−m−1) and hence yqi (k¯ + 1) A Q(n,m), and
also ζi(k¯+1) A Q(n,m). Next, the property that u(k¯+1)
and ζi(k¯ + 1) for the system composed of (3) and (11)
are within the range [−2n−m−1, 2n−m−1) implies that
κˆi(ζi(k¯ + 1), y
q
1(k¯ + 1), · · · , yqN (k¯ + 1))A [−2n−m−1, 2n−m−1)
κˆi(ζi(k¯ + 1), yq1(k¯ + 1), · · · , yqN (k¯ + 1))A [−2n−m−1, 2n−m−1).
As a result,
col(ζi(k¯ + 1), y
q
1(k¯ + 1), · · · , yqN (k¯ + 1)) A Cn,m. (19)
By mathematical induction, one has (16) for all k =
0, 1, 2, · · · . Therefore, the closed-loop system under con-
sideration is always equivalent to the one composed of
(3) and (11). Hence, the desired control performance,
that is, the property P1, is achieved. 2
Remark 4.1 To guarantee the control performance
in a secure control environment, the prerequisite is
the existence of the controller (11) with the same
performance. Additional conditions must also be sat-
isfied to avoid a computation overflow or underflow
when cryptographic mechanisms are applied. Firstly,
the signals yi(k), ui(k), ζi(k) must be within the range
[−2n−m−1, 2n−m−1) such that it can be quantized with
the error up to 2−m in the space Q(n,m) without over-
flow. It is worth mentioning that reset of controller (e.g.,
the controller state is set to a publicly known number
periodically in [35]) can be avoided in this paper. Sec-
ondly, the functions κˆi and κˆi must satisfy (13), such
that their values are rational numbers in base 2 without
causing an underflow. For this purpose, these functions
take the linear form of integer coefficients, which are ex-
plicitly constructed later. The third condition (14) shows
that the required functions κˆi and κˆi can be equivalently
realized by the functions κi and κi applied on the ci-
phertexts, provided that the cryptosystem has a certain
homomorphic property and the aforementioned overflow
or underflow issues are avoided. Satisfaction of these
conditions create additional challenges on the design of
the controller, which will be explicitly analyzed in the
subsequent sections.
Next, the specific encryption-decryption protocols
are designed in the following theorem, which guaran-
tees the cryptographic property in Theorem 4.1, as
well as the property P2. In the following,
∑
and
∏
represent the normal summation and (element-wise)
multiplication respectively. Also, for a real matrix
A = [aij ] ∈ Rr1×r2 with aij being the (i, j)-th entry, and
a vector b = [b1, · · · br2 ]T , let the following vectors be
∏
E |A|o (sgn(A)b) =

∏r2
i=1 E |a1i|o (sgn(a1i)bi)
...∏r2
i=1 E
|ar1i|
o (sgn(ar1i)bi)
 ,
∏
b|A| =

∏r2
i=1 b
|a1i|
i
...∏r2
i=1 b
|ar1i|
i
 .
Theorem 4.2 In Theorem 4.1, suppose the control
functions κˆi and κˆi are linear with integer coefficients,
that is,
κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN ) =
N∑
j=0
φijcj ,
κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN ) =
N∑
j=0
ϕijcj (20)
for integer matrices φij and ϕij. If EP , ER,i, and E¯R,i are
designed as follows:
• EP : ZnP 7→ Zn2P is a Paillier encryption with
nP > max{2n
N∑
j=0
|φij |1, 2n
N∑
j=0
|ϕij |1}
and the private key only available to all entities.
• ER,i : ZnR 7→ ZnR is an RSA encryption with nR ≥ n2P
and the private key only available to the i-th controller.
• E¯R,i : ZnR 7→ ZnR is an RSA encryption with the
private key only available to the i-th entity.
Then, the cryptographic property in Theorem 4.1 is au-
tomatically satisfied for
κi(Eo(co,−co), Eo(c1,−c1), · · · , Eo(cN ,−cN ))
=
N∏
j=0
E |φij |o (sgn(φij)cj) modn2P ,
κi(Eo(co,−co), Eo(c1,−c1), · · · , Eo(cN ,−cN ))
=
[ ∏N
j=0 E |ϕij |o (sgn(ϕij)cj) modn2P∏N
j=0 E |ϕij |o (−sgn(ϕij)cj) modn2P
]
. (21)
Also the property P2 is achieved.
Proof: We first prove the cryptographic property in The-
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orem 4.1. One has
In,m(κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN ))
=2m
N∑
j=0
φijcj mod 2
n
=2m
N∑
j=0
|φij |sgn(φij)cj mod 2n
=
N∑
j=0
|φij |In,m(sgn(φij)cj) mod 2n.
As EP is a Paillier encryption, one has
N∏
j=0
E |φij |P (In,m(sgn(φij)cj)) modn2P
=EP (
N∑
j=0
|φij |In,m(sgn(φij)cj))
noting 0 ≤ In,m(sgn(φij)cj) < 2n < nP and 0 ≤∑N
j=0 |φij |In,m(sgn(φij)cj) ≤ 2n
∑N
j=0 |φij |1 < nP .
Then,
E−1P (
N∏
j=0
E |φij |P (In,m(sgn(φij)cj)) modn2P ) mod 2n
=
N∑
j=0
|φij |In,m(sgn(φij)cj) mod 2n
=In,m(κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN ))
and hence
I−1n,m(E−1P (
N∏
j=0
E |φij |o (sgn(φij)cj) modn2P ) mod 2n)
=κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN ).
As a result,
Do(
N∏
j=0
E |φij |o (sgn(φij)cj) modn2P ) = κˆi(co, c1, · · · , cN ).
So, the first equation of (14) is proved noting (21). The
second equation of (14) can be proved using similar ar-
guments.
We can prove (i) of Definition 3.2 noting that, in
yi(k) = ER,i(EP (In,m(yqi (k),−yqi (k))), the private key
of ER,i is unavailable to the entities and the private
key of EP is unavailable to the control units; and in
ui(k) = Do(E¯−1i (vi(k))), the private key of E¯i is un-
available to all entities and control units except the self
entity i.
Finally, we can prove (ii) of Definition 3.2 noting that,
inDi(yi(k)) = EP (In,m(yqi (k),−yqi (k))), the private key
of EP is unavailable to the control units; and in ui(k) =
I−1n,m(E−1P (vi(k)) mod 2n), the private key of EP is un-
available to the control units. 2
Remark 4.2 The importance of Theorem 4.2 is two-
fold. On the one hand, it describes the specific cryptosys-
tems EP , ER,i, and E¯R,i, with their key generation rules;
on the other hand, it also gives the explicit construction of
the controller functions κi and κi. It facilitates the prac-
tical implementation of the desired private controller.
Remark 4.3 The cryptographic techniques, especially
the management of private keys in Theorem 4.2 guaran-
tee the property P2. If more than one entity is hacked
and becomes malicious, they cannot eavesdrop and ob-
tain the information of the remaining benign entities, as
they cannot break the outer-layer RSA encryption. If all
the controllers are under attack and the RSA private keys
are disclosed, the information of the entity i within the
system still remains secure due to the inner-layer Pail-
lier encryption. The secrecy of the entity i’s information
is affected only when there is a malicious party who is
able to obtain both the Paillier private key and the RSA
private key.
Remark 4.4 Under Theorem 4.2, the controller (5)
with (4) takes the following specific form
vi(k) =
∏
(z
sgn(φi0)
i (k))
|φi0|
×
N∏
j=1
E |φij |o (sgn(φij)yqj (k)) modn2P
[
z+i (k + 1)
z−i (k + 1)
]
=

∏
(z
sgn(ϕi0)
i (k))
|ϕi0|∏N
j=1 E |ϕij |o
(sgn(ϕij)y
q
j (k)) modn
2
P∏
(z
−sgn(ϕi0)
i (k))
|ϕi0|∏N
j=1 E |ϕij |o
(−sgn(ϕij)yqj (k)) modn2P

[
z+i (0)
z−i (0)
]
=Eo
([
ζi(0)
−ζi(0)
])
(22)
where z
sgn(φi0)
i = z
+
i or z
−
i for sgn(φi0) = +1 or −1,
respectively, in the element-wise manner. When φi0 =
0, (z
sgn(φi0)
i (k))
|φi0| = 1 vanishes in the product. When
sgn(ϕi0) = +1 and sgn(φi0) = +1, the controller reduces
to
vi(k) =
∏
(z+i (k))
|φi0|
×
N∏
j=1
E |φij |o (sgn(φij)yqj (k)) modn2P
z+i (k + 1) =
∏
(z+i (k))
|ϕi0|
×
N∏
j=1
E |φij |o (sgn(ϕij)yqj (k)) modn2P
z+i (0) =Eo(ζi(0)), (23)
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with the z−i (k+1)-dynamics vanished. For the same rea-
son, when sgn(ϕi0) = +1 and sgn(φi0) = −1, the con-
troller reduces similarly with the z+i (k+1)-dynamics van-
ished.
5 Design of Controller
Next, we provide a specific controller design for the se-
cure stabilization problem for MIMO systems followed
by an example. The plant (3) takes the following linear
form, with the partition ui(k) = col(u
a
i (k), u
b
i (k)) and
yi(k) = col(y
a
i (k), y
b
i (k)),
xi(k + 1) =
N∑
j=1
Aijxj(k) +Biu
a
i (k)
yai (k) =γ1Cixi(k)
ybi (k) =γ2u
b
i (k), i = 1, · · · , N, (24)
where all the matricesAij ,Bi, andCi are rational matri-
ces whose elements are rational numbers and γ1, γ2 > 0
are two parameters. The plant essentially consists of the
upper two equations from the input uai to the output y
a
i .
The parameter γ1 modifies the output to match the re-
quired resolution. The third equation between ubi (k) and
ybi (k) deliberately introduces an additional communica-
tion channel between the plant and the remote controller
such that the state of remote controller can be sent back
to the plant and processed by the gain γ2, also to match
the required resolution. The so-called resolution has to
be matched through γ1 and γ2, because only the integer
gains can be implemented in the private controller de-
sign in the encrypted space, as elaborated in Lemma 5.1.
In this case, the proposed paradigm applies with zi(k) =
z(k) and κi = κ, i = 1, · · · , N , and the controller (5)
used in Theorem 4.1 takes the specific form with the
linear functions κˆi and κˆ given as follows:
uai (k) =
N∑
j=1
φij [y
b
j (k) + δ
b
j (k)]
ubi (k) =(ei ⊗ Ii)ζ(k)
ζ(k + 1) =
N∑
j=1
ϕoj [y
b
j (k) + δ
b
j (k)] +
N∑
j=1
ϕj [y
a
j (k) + δ
a
j (k)]
(25)
for integer matrices ϕo = [ϕo1, · · · , ϕoN ], φi =
[φi1, · · · , φiN ], i = 1, . . . , N , andϕ = [ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ]. Here,
ei = [0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0] whose i-th element is one and
Ii is an identity matrix whose dimension is consistent
with that of xi. It is noted that y
b
i (k) = γ2(ei ⊗ Ii)ζ(k)
and δbi (k) is the associated quantization error. Let
δi(k) = col(δ
a
i (k), δ
b
i (k)). It is worth mentioning that
the controller coefficients represented by the matrices
ϕo, φi and ϕ must be integers to avoid a computation
underflow as explained in Remark 4.1. The need for
controllers having integer coefficients has also been dis-
cussed in literature such as in [36] for PID controllers
and FIR filters.
Representing the system and the controller in a
compact form, let us denote A = [Aij ]N×N , B =
block diag(B1, . . . , BN ), C = block diag(C1, . . . , CN ),
φ = col(φ1, . . . , φN ), and define two matrices
Ac =
[
A γ2Bφ
γ1ϕC γ2ϕo
]
, Bc =
[
0 Bφ
ϕ ϕo
]
. (26)
We first give a technical lemma under the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 5.1 The pairs (A,B) and (C,A) for the
system (24) are controllable and observable.
Lemma 5.1 Under Assumption 5.1, there exist γ1, γ2 >
0 and integer matrices ϕo, φ, and ϕ, such that the matrix
Ac defined in (26) is a Schur matrix.
Proof: Under Assumption 5.1, there exist two matrices
K and L such that
A˜c =
[
A BK
−LC A+BK + LC
]
=
[
I 0
I I
][
A+BK BK
0 A+ LC
][
I 0
−I I
]
is a Schur matrix. As rational numbers are dense, the
matrices K and L can be selected as rational matrices.
Therefore, we can pick γ1, γ2 > 0 such that the following
matrices
φ = K/γ2, ϕ = −L/γ1, ϕo = (A+BK + LC)/γ2
are integer matrices. Also, it is easy to check that Ac and
A˜c are identical, which are Schur matrices. 2
Before we give the main result of this section, let us define
some notations for the convenience of presentation. From
Theorem 33 of Chapter 7d of [37], for the Schur matrix
Ac defined in (26), there exist 0 < ρ < 1 and M >
0 such that ‖Akc‖ ≤ Mρk. Let σ = ‖Bc‖d where d is
the dimension of δ(k) = col(δa(k), δb(k)) for δa(k) =
col(δa1(k), . . . , δ
a
N (k)) and δ
b(k) = col(δb1 (k), . . . , δ
b
N (k)).
Let xc(k) = col(x(k), ζ(k)).
Theorem 5.1 Consider the closed-loop system com-
posed of (24) and (25), under Assumption 5.1, with the
parameters γ1, γ2 > 0 and integer matrices ϕo, φ, and ϕ
selected in Lemma 5.1. The closed-loop system achieves
the desired control performance
‖xc(k)‖ ≤Mρk‖xc(0)‖+ Mσ
1− ρ2
−m (27)
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for |δ(k)| < 2−m. Moreover, the signals yi(k), ui(k), ζ(k) A
[−2n−m−1, 2n−m−1), i = 1, · · · , N, if the initial condi-
tion satisfies ‖xc(0)‖ ≤ Ro for
Ro =
β
M
− σ
1− ρ2
−m,
β <2n−m−1 min{1, 1− ‖φi‖2
−n+1
γ2‖φi‖ ,
1
γ1‖Ci‖ ,
1
γ2
}.
(28)
Proof: Let y¯i(k) = Cixi(k) = y
a
i (k)/γ1. It is easy to
check that the controller (25) is equivalent to
uai (k) =γ2φiζ(k) + φiδ
b(k)
ζ(k + 1) =γ2ϕoζ(k) + γ1
N∑
j=1
ϕj y¯j(k)
+ ϕδa(k) + ϕoδ
b(k). (29)
Without considering the quantization errors, the closed-
loop system composed of
xi(k + 1) =
N∑
j=1
Aijxj(k) +Biu
a
i (k)
y¯i(k) =Cixi(k), i = 1, · · · , N. (30)
and
uai (k) =γ2φiζ(k)
ζ(k + 1) =γ2ϕoζ(k) + γ1
N∑
j=1
ϕj y¯j(k) (31)
can be proved to be stable. In fact, it can be put into the
following compact form composed of
x(k + 1) =Ax(k) +Bua(k)
y¯(k) =Cx(k) (32)
and
ua(k) =γ2φζ(k)
ζ(k + 1) =γ2ϕoζ(k) + γ1ϕy¯(k), (33)
where ua = col(ua1, . . . , u
a
N ), y¯ = col(y¯1, . . . , y¯N ). The
controller (33) is a typical Luenberger observer-based
stabilizer. Furthermore, the closed-loop system com-
posed of (32) and (33) takes the following form
xc(k + 1) = Acxc(k) (34)
for the Schur matrix Ac given in (26). So, the
closed-loop system (34) is asymptotically stable, i.e.,
limk→∞ xc(k) = 0.
When the quantization errors are taken into considera-
tion, the controller (29) has the following compact form
ua(k) =γ2φζ(k) + φδ
b(k)
ζ(k + 1) =γ2ϕoζ(k) + γ1ϕy¯(k) + ϕδ
a(k) + ϕoδ
b(k).
(35)
Then, the closed-loop system composed of (32) and (35)
takes the following form
xc(k + 1) = Acxc(k) +Bcδ(k) (36)
for Ac and Bc defined in (26). From (36), we have
xc(k) = A
k
cxc(0) +
k−1∑
j=0
Ak−j−1c Bcδ(j). (37)
Noting ‖Akc‖ ≤ Mρk and σ = ‖Bc‖d, the property (27)
follows; see, e.g., [38].
From (27) and ‖xc(0)‖ ≤ Ro, one has
‖ζ(k)‖ ≤ ‖xc(k)‖ ≤MRo + Mσ
1− ρ2
−m = β < 2n−m−1.
More calculation shows
‖uai (k)‖∞ ≤γ2‖φi‖‖ζ(k)‖+ ‖φi‖2−m
≤γ2‖φi‖β + ‖φi‖2−m < 2n−m−1
‖ubi (k)‖ =‖ζ(k)‖ < 2n−m−1
‖yai (k)‖ ≤γ1‖Ci‖‖xi(k)‖ ≤ γ1‖Ci‖β < 2n−m−1
‖ybi (k)‖ =γ2‖ζ(k)‖ ≤ γ2β < 2n−m−1.
It concludes that yi(k), ui(k), ζ(k) ∈ [−2n−m−1, 2n−m−1),
i = 1, · · · , N . 2
Remark 5.1 In the desired performance (27), the
term Mρk‖xc(0)‖ vanishes as k → ∞, so the closed-
loop system state xc(k) is asymptotically bounded by
[Mσ/(1− ρ)]2−m where 2−m is sufficiently small for a
sufficiently large m. The initial states can be sufficiently
large for a sufficiently large Ro, and hence β, at the cost
of a sufficiently large n.
Remark 5.2 Based on (25), the implemented controller
(22) has the following specific form
vi(k) =
[∏N
j=1 E |φij |o (sgn(φij)[ybj ]q(k)) modn2P
(ei ⊗ I)z(k)
]
z(k + 1) =
N∏
j=1
E |ϕoj |o (sgn(ϕoj)[ybj ]q(k))
×
N∏
j=1
E |ϕj |o (sgn(ϕj)[yaj ]q(k)) modn2P
z(0) =Eo (ζ(0)) . (38)
10
By combining Theorems 4.1, 4.2, and 5.1 and noting
that the quantization property is simply satisfied, one
has the following result.
Theorem 5.2 Consider the system (24) with the private
controller (4), (5), (7), and (8), for two specified integers
n and m. Under Assumption 5.1, select the parameters
γ1, γ2 > 0 and integer matrices ϕo, φ and ϕ according
to Lemma 5.1 and hence define the linear functions κˆi
and κˆ as in (25). Let EP , ER,i, and E¯R,i be designed in
Theorem 4.2. Then, the controller (5) with (4) takes the
specific form (38). For any initial condition satisfying
‖xc(0)‖ ≤ Ro with Ro given in (28), the closed-loop sys-
tem achieves the desired control performance P1 in the
sense of (27) and the security property P2.
Example 1 We consider the two-input two-output sys-
tem (24) of the following specific form
x1(k + 1) =x1(k) + x2(k) + 0.5u
a
1(k)
x2(k + 1) =x2(k) + u
a
1(k) + u
a
2(k)
ya1(k) =γ1x1(k)
ya2(k) =γ1x2(k). (39)
It can also be put in the form (32) with A =
[
1 1
0 1
]
,
B =
[
0.5 0
1 1
]
, and C =
[
1 0
0 1
]
. Obviously, Assump-
tion 5.1 holds, we can design the feedback gain and ob-
server gain for the observer-based controller (38), with
the parameters γ1 = 0.1, γ2 = 0.1, and integer ma-
trices φ =
[
20 −10
−65 −10
]
, ϕ =
[
−10 −12
10 20
]
, and ϕo =[
30 17
−55 −30
]
. The simulation results are illustrated in
Fig. 2. The left graph shows that the states of the sys-
tem approach zero as expected by the desired control per-
formance. The observer is implemented in the encrypted
space with the states plotted in the right graph. The pres-
ence of the observer states in disorder verifies that the
privacy of the controller remain intact. The left graph of
Fig. 3 zooms in on the trajectories of the system states
and shows the residual errors when the states approach
zero. The steady state errors are caused by quantization
withm = 6 and they can be reduced using a higher resolu-
tion. For example, significantly smaller errors are shown
in the right graph for a repeated simulation with m = 9
and all the other conditions remain unchanged.
The simulation was conducted with n = 24 and the ini-
tial conditions x1(0) = 10, x2(0) = 20, ζ1(0) = 12,
and ζ2(0) = 23. The modular bits for generating keys of
the first layer Paillier encryption are set to be 64 and
those for the second layer to be 256. The simulation plat-
form is MATLAB in a laptop computer of 2.2 GHz In-
tel Core i7 and 16 GB memory integrated with an open-
source C implementation of the Paillier cryptosystems
[39]. The total simulation time including double-layer en-
cryption/decryption (two encryption/decryption compu-
tations in the outer layer and one encryption/decryption
computation in the inner layer) together with the control
algorithm was recorded as 2.05s for 51 instants, which
implies that the average computation time for each con-
trol instant is 40.2ms. It can be well accommodated by
one sampling period in many industrial applications such
as control systems for chemical processes of typical sam-
pling periods in seconds [40, 41].
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have established a secure networked
control system design approach for large-scale cyber-
physical systems using a novel double-layer crypto-
graphic scheme. The approach is based on a design sep-
aration principle and is supported by a rigorous analyt-
ical proof. In particular, a secure stabilization controller
of MIMO systems has been presented with numerical
simulations. The double-layer cryptographic scheme
used Paillier and RSA cryptosystems to provide protec-
tion of information of plant entities and control units
from any malicious party. Even though the approach is
general, due to the specific use of Paillier, one can only
handle the control laws involving linear computations.
In the future work, we are planning to investigate other
homomorphic cryptosystems to cater for more compli-
cated nonlinear control laws. The computational perfor-
mances of the Paillier and RSA algorithms are typically
of the order of tens to hundreds of milliseconds [42, 43],
as also seen in the simulation example. This in turn im-
plies that these computations in private controllers do
not cause any delay issue in the current discrete-time
setting environment as they can be finished within one
sampling period in many industrial applications such
as chemical processes and smart grid networks. Each
cryptographic algorithm has its own advantages and it
would be interesting to investigate different options for
achieving greater efficiency in future research.
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